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Abstract
In recent years, regulators have increased their focus on the capital
adequacy of banking institutions to enhance the stability of the
financial system. The purpose of the present paper is to shed some
light on whether and how Swiss Banks react to constraints placed
by the regulator on their capital. Building on previous work by
Shrieves and Dahl (1992), we use a simultaneous equations model
to analyse adjustments in capital and risk at Swiss banks, when
those approach the minimum regulatory capital level. Our results
indicate that regulatory pressure induce banks to increase their
capital, but does not affect the level of risk.
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In recent years, regulators have increased their focus on the capital adequacy of banking
institutions in order to enhance the stability of the financial system. A major step in that
direction was the 1988 agreement among G-10 countries on minimal risk-based capital
requirements for banks, referred to as the Basle accord; very recently, the Basle
Committee has launched a consultation for a fundamental revision of the Basle accord.1
The increasing reliance of regulators on capital requirements raises several questions:
Do banks respond to capital requirements, i. e. are the penalties for falling below the
regulatory guidelines large enough to induce banks to raise their capital ratio? How do
banks improve their capital ratio when they approach the regulatory minimum, i. e. do
they increase their capital or do they reduce their higher-risk assets? Do increases in
capital requirements induce banks to reduce or to increase the riskiness of their
portfolio?
With economic theory split over these questions, many authors have tried to assess
empirically the impact of capital requirements on banks’ behaviour. Most studies
concentrate on US banks, while empirical evidence has remained scarce for European
banks, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom.2 Therefore, an important
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contribution of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence on bank capital
behaviour outside the United States. The examination of Swiss banks capital behaviour
is of interest in several respects. Firstly, Switzerland has much more experience with
risk-based capital requirements than the United States; in that context, the results
obtained for Swiss banks may better reflect the long-term effects of capital requirements.
Secondly, the regulatory pressure implied by capital requirements may be stronger in
Switzerland, where a breach of the guidelines rapidly leads to the closure or to the take-
over of the bank; in the United States, by contrast, undercapitalised banks are not
necessarily closed, but are subject to restrictions on their activities and to higher deposit
insurance premiums. Thirdly, Swiss banks may differ from US banks in their ability to
adjust capital and risk. This is due to the illiquidity of the Swiss market for small banks
stocks and the absence of a market for asset-backed securities in Switzerland. Finally,
Swiss capital requirements stipulate a larger number of risk-classes than the Basel
accord, which may reduce the scope for regulatory arbitrage at Swiss banks. To our
knowledge, only two studies provide empirical evidence on capital requirements for
Switzerland. Sheldon (1996a) finds that Swiss banks are among the safest in terms of
default probability as their higher capital ratios overcompensate the higher volatility of
their ROA. Sheldon (1996b) observes that for the 1987-94 period, Swiss banks had a
stable capital ratio and experienced a decrease in the volatility of their ROA, the net
effect being a decrease in their default probability.
In the present paper, we use the simultaneous equations model developed by Shrieves
and Dahl (1992) to analyse adjustments in capital and risk by Swiss banks as they3
approach the minimum regulatory capital level. An important aspect of this
methodology is that it recognises that changes in both capital and risk have exogenous
as well as endogenous character. The present study differs from Sheldon’s work on
Swiss banks in three main areas. First, bank capital and risk behaviour is modelled
explicitly. Second, we take account of the regulatory pressure implied by the capital
requirements. Finally, we examine a much larger number of banks.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the rationale for capital
requirements and the theories related to banks’ choices in respect of capital and risk.
Section 3 summarises the recent developments of capital requirements in Switzerland
and presents some data on Swiss banks' capital. In section 4, we introduce the model
developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) with some modifications. Section 5 presents the
data, the empirical methodology, and the results. Section 6 concludes the analysis.
2. Capital requirements and bank behaviour: review of theory3
2.1.  Rationale for capital requirements
Capital regulation is motivated principally by the concern that a bank may hold less
capital than is socially optimal relative to its riskiness as negative externalities resulting
from bank default are not reflected in market capital requirements.
In theory, the stabilising effects of capital requirements are supported by models based
on the option-pricing model. In this framework, an unregulated bank will take excessive
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portfolio and leverage risks in order to maximise its shareholder value at the expense of
the deposit insurance [See Benston et al. (1986), Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley
and Furlong (1990)]. Capital requirements can reduce these moral hazard incentives by
forcing bank shareholders to absorb a larger part of the losses, thereby reducing the
value of the deposit insurance put option. With more capital and less risk-taking, the
effect is clearly a decrease in the bank’s default probability. The ability of capital
requirements to strengthen the stability of the banking system has been challenged in
models based on the mean-variance framework. Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and
Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) find that if capital is relatively expensive, the forced
reduction in leverage diminishes the bank’s expected returns. As a consequence, the
bank’s owners may choose a higher point on the efficiency frontier, with a higher return
and a higher risk. In some cases, the increase in the bank’s risk overcompensates the
increase in capital and leads to a higher default probability.
The introduction of risk-based capital standards can be considered as an attempt to
eliminate the possible perverse effects of capital requirements. Unfortunately, empirical
evidence indicates that current capital requirements do not reflect banks’ risk-taking
accurately. Avery and Berger (1991), for example, find that the Basle risk-weighting
framework explains only about 5% of banks’ loan performance. If there are flaws in the
risk-weightings, risk-based capital standards may have destabilising effects, as banks
constrained by the capital requirements can improve their capital ratio by decreasing
risk in terms of the official standards while business risk is actually increased.5
2.2. Capital requirements, adjustment costs and capital buffer
In the absence of adjustment costs in the capital ratio, banks would never hold more
capital than required by the regulators or by the market. In practice, however, adjusting
the capital ratio may be costly. Equity issues may, in the case of information
asymmetries, convey negative information to the market on the bank’s economic value. 4
Moreover, shareholders may be reluctant to contribute new capital if the bank is
severely undercapitalised, as most of the benefits would accrue to creditors. In the
presence of these adjustments costs, banks falling under the legal capital requirements
will not be able to react instantaneously. They may then be subject to repeated
regulatory penalties, or even worse, closed down. As a consequence, banks may prefer
to hold a “buffer” of excess capital to reduce the probability of falling under the legal
capital requirements, especially if their capital ratio is very volatile.
As we will see in section 4, adjustments costs and the related capital buffer play a central
role in the partial adjustment model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and in its
extensions by Jacques and Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998), and Ediz, Michael
and Perraudin (1998).
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3. Capital regulation and capital data for Swiss banks
Capital requirements constitute the main banking supervisory instrument in
Switzerland. The Federal Banking Commission intervenes little in banks’ activities and
does not directly conduct on-site examinations, delegating this task to external auditors.
By contrast, a breach of the capital requirements is considered a major infringement of
banking legislation and is not tolerated by the Federal Banking Commission. Banks
remaining undercapitalised for prolonged periods are closed. This drastic outcome is
often avoided through a take-over of the undercapitalised institution by another bank.
3.1.  Recent developments in the sphere of capital regulation at Swiss banks
As long ago as 1980, Switzerland introduced risk-based capital requirements for on-
balance sheet positions and, to a lesser extent, for off-balance sheet positions. In 1989,
the capital regulation was revised to take account of the development of off-balance
sheet and securitisation activities. This reform, which constituted a partial
harmonisation with the Basle accord, introduced heavier charges for off-balance sheet
activities and allowed the banks to count more of their subordinated debt in tier 2.
Capital charges for on-balance sheet activities and cross-border transactions were
reduced. The 1995 revision involved a more systematic adaptation to the Basle accord
and its subsequent amendment for off-balance sheet positions. The first change was to
base the risk-weighting framework on the riskiness of the counterparty rather than the
asset type. The revision also introduced a more accurate treatment of off-balance sheet7
positions. The last revision, dated 1997, introduced capital charges for market risk in
accordance with the amended version of the Basle accord on market risk.
Overall, the refinement and the adaptation of the Swiss capital requirements to the Basle
guidelines have lead to a small relief of the capital burden for Swiss banks, as indicated
by the immediate drops of required capital following each revision. Nevertheless, Swiss
capital requirements remain more detailed (15 asset categories instead of five) and more
stringent than the Basle accord (Swiss risk-weightings are generally higher than the
Basle ones, although both frameworks apply the 8% capital ratio on risk-weighted
assets).
3.2. Data on the capital adequacy of Swiss banks
Swiss banks are well capitalised by international standards. According to the Banker
(1998), the average BIS ratio of big Swiss banks represented 13.8% and exceeded the G-
10 countries' average by more than 2.5 percentage points.
Table 1 shows the average level of excess capital as a percentage of required capital and
its standard deviation for different categories of Swiss banks, based on the Swiss capital
requirements for the period 1989-1996. At the four big banks, excess capital represents
8.1% of required capital. Big banks pursue all lines of banking business throughout
Switzerland and abroad. Their relatively low capital buffer may be related to their easy
access to capital markets, which allows them to raise capital quickly. Excess capital
represents 21.0% of required capital at cantonal banks (25 institutions) and 25.2% at
regional banks (125 institutions). Both cantonal and regional banks focus on the8
domestic market, and their activity is less diversified. A specificity of the cantonal banks
is that their liabilities are guaranteed by the canton.5 The difficulty for cantonal and
regional banks to raise capital in a relatively illiquid market for small Swiss banks’
stocks may explain their larger capital buffer. As predicted by the buffer theory, table 1
indicates a positive relationship between the level of excess capital and its volatility as
measured by the standard deviation.
Table 1: Capital data for different categories of Swiss banks (average 1992-1996)
4. The model
4.1. Simultaneous model and partial adjustment framework for capital and risk
The theories discussed in section 2 presume that capital and risk decisions are
determined simultaneously. To recognise this, we base our analysis of Swiss banks’
capital behaviour on the simultaneous equations model developed by Shrieves and Dahl
(1992). In their model, observed changes in banks’ capital and risk levels consist of two
components, a discretionary adjustment and a change caused by factors exogenous to
the bank:
DCAP j,t = D
dCAPj,t + Ej,t; (1)
DRISKj,t = D
dRISKj,t + Sj,t, (2)
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where DCAP j,t  and DRISKj,t are the observed changes in capital and risk levels,
respectively, for bank  j in period t.
The discretionary changes in capital and risk D
dCAPj,t  and D
dRISK j,t  are modelled using
the partial adjustment framework, thereby recognising that banks may not be able to
adjust their desired capital ratio and risk levels instantaneously. In this framework, the
discretionary changes in capital and risk are proportional to the difference between the




j,t - CAPj,t-1); (3)
D
dRISK j,t = b(RISK
*
j,t - RISK j,t-1), (4)
where CAP
*
j,t  and RISK
*
j,t are bank  j’s target capital and risk levels, respectively.
Substituting equations (3) and (4)  into equations (1) and (2), the observed changes in
capital and risk can be written:
DCAP j,t = a(CAP
*
j,t - CAPj,t-1)+ Ej,t; (5)
DRISKj,t = b(RISK
*
j,t - RISKj,t-1)+ Sj,t. (6)
Thus, observed changes in capital and risk in period t are a function of the target capital
and risk levels, the lagged capital and risk levels, and any exogenous factors.
 4.2. Definitions of capital and risk
We use two definitions of banks’ capital: the ratio of capital to total assets (RCTA) and
the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (RCWA). Shrieves and Dahl (1992) used the10
first definition. The second definition has become more popular since the introduction
of risk-weighted capital standards and has been used by Jacques and Nigro (1997),
Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) and Ediz, Michael and Perraudin (1998).
Measurement and definition of banks’ risk is quite problematic and the literature
suggests a number of alternatives, all of which are subject to some criticism. In this
study, we opt for the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA), as proposed by
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and used subsequently by Jacques and Nigro (1997) and
Aggarwal and Jacques (1998). The rationale for using this measure is that portfolio risk
is primarily determined by the allocation of assets across the different risk categories. A
clear advantage of RWA is that it reflects banks’ decisions on risk-taking with
appropriate timeliness. The reliance on this indicator, however, supposes that the risk-
weightings correctly reflect the economic risk of the different asset categories.
4.3. Variables affecting changes in banks’ capital and risk
Equations (5) and (6) predict that changes in capital and risk in period t are a function of
the target capital and risk levels, the lagged capital and risk levels and any exogenous
factors or shocks. In the following, we present the explanatory variables and their
expected impact on banks’ capital and risk. All these variables have been used by
Shrieves and Dahl (1992), with the exception of the current profits variable, emphasised
by Aggarwal and Jacques (1998), and the regulatory pressure variables, proposed by
Ediz et al. (1998) and Aggarwal and Jacques (1998).
4.3.1.  Size11
Size may influence target risk and capital levels due to its relationship with risk
diversification, investment opportunities and access to equity capital. The natural log of
total assets (SIZE) is included in the capital and in the risk equations to capture size
effects.
4.3.2. Current profits
Current profits may have a positive effect on banks’ capital if financial institutions
prefer to increase capital through retained earnings than through equity issues, as the
latter may convey negative information to the market about the bank’s value in the
presence of asymmetric information. The bank’s return on assets (ROA) is included in
the capital equation with an expected positive effect on capital.
4.3.3.  Current loan losses
A bank’s current loan losses affect the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets as they
lead to a decrease in the nominal amount of the risk-weighted assets. These losses
(LLOSS), approximated with the ratio of new provisions to total assets, are therefore
included in the risk equation with an expected negative effect on risk.
4.3.4. Regulatory pressure
The buffer theory predicts that a bank approaching the regulatory minimum capital
ratio may have an incentive to boost capital and reduce risk in order to avoid the
regulatory costs triggered by a breach of the capital requirements. However, poorly
capitalised banks may also be tempted to take more risk in the hope that higher12
expected returns will help them to increase their capital ("gambling for resurrection").6
We expect regulatory pressure to have a substantial impact on Swiss banks' behaviour,
given the tough attitude of the Federal Banking Commission towards banks that breach
the capital guidelines. The Deposit insurance guarantee scheme, which is not
compulsory in Switzerland, cannot exert regulatory pressure on banks. However, low
capitalised banks may be subject to informal pressure by other members of this
privately financed insurance scheme.
Regulatory pressure can be evaluated in several ways. Ediz et al. (1998) adopt a
relatively refined approach of regulatory pressure that reflects the impact of the capital
ratio’s volatility on the probability of failing to meet the legal requirements. For
Switzerland, this probabilistic approach is quite appealing, given the positive
relationship between excess capital and its volatility observed in table 1. Aggarwal and
Jacques (1998) measure regulatory pressure using the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA)
classification between adequately capitalised and undercapitalised institutions. This
approach is also of interest for our study, as both PCA and Swiss banking law consider
banks with a capital to RCWA of less than 8% as undercapitalised. However, the very
small number of officially undercapitalised Swiss institutions (3 banks per year
compared to 36 in the US) may reduce the reliability of the estimates based on this
approach.
We have estimated our model using both measures of regulatory pressure. Within the
probabilistic approach, the regulatory pressure variable REG is unity if the bank’s
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capital ratio is within one standard deviation of the minimum capital requirement
defined in the banking law and zero otherwise. Within the PCA based approach, we
build a first regulatory variable PCAU, which is unity for banks with an RCWA of less
than 8% and zero otherwise, and a second regulatory pressure variable PCAA, which is
unity for banks with an RCWA comprised between 8 and 10%.
4.3.5. Simultaneous changes in risk and capital
The theoretical models mentioned in section 2 suggest that banks' capital and risk
choices are interdependent, which requires the inclusion of both variables in the right
part of the model. In a regime of risk-weighted capital requirements, we can assume that
banks bounded by the regulatory capital requirements will compensate an increase
(decrease) in RWA with an increase (decrease) in RCTA to keep their RCWA constant. A
positive relationship between changes in RWA and RCTA would also be compatible
with the assumption that banks not bounded by the capital requirements adjust risk and
capital in the same direction to maintain their default probability at an acceptable level,
thereby protecting their franchise value. For these reasons, we expect a positive
relationship between changes in RWA and changes in RCTA; as a consequence, the
relationship between changes in RWA and RCWA may be rather weak, or even not
significant at all.
4.3.6. Regulatory shocks and macroeconomic shocks
Changes in the capital regime may directly affect capital and risk measures, as they
modify the calculation method of these variables. Macroeconomic shocks such as a
change in the volume or in the structure of loans demand can also affect banks’ capital14
ratios and risk. To take account of these changes in the macro-economic or regulatory
environment which might systematically impact on observed risk and capital
adjustments in any given year, dummy variables are added to the specification for each
year of the reference period. As the dummies sum to unity, we omit the general
intercept. Econometrically, this is equivalent to estimating an intercept plus a dummy
for all but one year, as in Shrieves and Dahl (1992).
4.4  Specification
On the basis of the analysis in sub-section 4.3, the model defined by equations (5) and (6)
is specified as follows:
DCAP j,t = a0 + a1 ￿REGj,t-1 + a2 ￿ROAj,t + a3 ￿SIZEj,t + a4 ￿DRISK j,t - a5 ￿CAPj,t-1 + e j,t (7)
DRISKj,t = a0 +a1￿REGj,t-1 +a2￿ LLOSS j,t +a3￿SIZEj,t +a4 ￿DCAP j,t - a5￿RISKj,t-1 +n j,t (8)
where REG represents regulatory pressure defined under the probabilistic approach.
Under the PCA approach, REG is replaced by the regulatory pressures variables PCAU
and PCAA.
5. Data, empirical methodology and results
5.1. Data and empirical methodology
The sample includes 4 big banks, 25 cantonal banks and 125 regional banks in existence
from 1989 to 1995 (a total of 924 observations spaced by bank and year), which
represents 82% of total assets in the Swiss banking system. Foreign banks were excluded
from the sample because of the very high frequency of entries and exits in this category.15
Changes in capital and risk are measured on a yearly basis, which represents the highest
periodicity for which data is systematically available.
Table 2 shows the mean values of the variables for each of the six sub-periods.
Table 2: Mean values of variables
Following Jacques and Nigro (1997) and Aggarwal and Jacques (1998), we estimate the
system of equations defined by (7) and (8) using a three-stage least-squares procedure.
This allows us to take account of the simultaneity of banks’ adjustments in capital and
risk and to get estimates that are asymptotically more efficient than under two-stage
least squares.7 The cross-sectional data are pooled over the six years of the reference
period, as in Shrieves and Dahl (1992).
5.2. Results for the system based on the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets
Table 3 presents the results for the system based on the ratio of capital to risk-weighted
assets. To save space, we limit the extensive discussion to the results obtained using the
probabilistic measure of regulatory pressure. The estimates obtained with the PCA
measure of regulatory pressure are discussed succinctly for comparison purposes.
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Table 3: Results for the system based on the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets
The system based on the probabilistic measure of regulatory pressure gives the
following results (left part of table 3). In the capital equation, current earnings (ROA)
have a significant and positive impact on capital, indicating that profitable banks can
more easily improve their capitalisation through retained earnings. SIZE has a negative
and significant impact on capital, indicating that large banks increased their ratio of
capital to risk-weighted assets less than other banks; here, a possible explanation is that
large Swiss banks have to compete on international markets with institutions that are, in
general, less capitalised. Regulatory pressure (REG) has a positive and significant
impact on the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. Ceteris paribus, banks within one
standard deviation of the regulatory minimum increase their capital ratio by 0.46
percentage points more than other banks. In the risk equation, the regulatory pressure
variable has no significant impact on banks’ risk, which indicates that banks
approaching the minimum capital requirements neither increased nor decreased the
share of risk-weighted assets in their portfolio. SIZE has a positive impact on risk,
reflecting big banks' disengagement from mortgage lending (preferential risk-weight of
50%) and their increased focus on corporate finance (100% risk-weight) during the
nineties. In both equations, no significant relationship emerges between changes in
capital and changes in risk.
The estimates obtained using the PCA measure of regulatory pressure (right part of
table 3) indicate that the regulatory variable for undercapitalised banks (PCAU) has a
positive and significant impact on capital but no significant impact on risk. Ceteris17
paribus, undercapitalised banks increase their capital by 2.4 percentage points more
than other banks. This adjustment is larger in amplitude, although less significant, than
that observed for the probabilistic measure of regulatory pressure. PCAA has no
significant impact on capital and risk.
5.3. Results for the system based on the ratio of capital to total assets
Table 4 presents the results for the system based on the ratio of capital to total assets.
Here again, we focus on the results obtained using the probabilistic measure of
regulatory pressure REG. In the capital equation, current earnings (ROA) have a
significant and positive impact on capital, indicating that profitable banks improve their
capitalisation through retained earnings. SIZE has a negative and significant impact on
capital, indicating that the big banks increased their capital less than other banks; here
again, the competitive pressure from less capitalised international banks constitutes a
plausible explanation. Finally, the regulatory pressure variable has a positive and
significant effect on the ratio of capital to total assets. Ceteris paribus, banks close to the
legal minimum requirements increase their capital by 0.28 percentage points more than
other banks. In the risk equation, regulatory pressure has no significant impact on
banks’ risk. For both equations, we observe a positive and significant relationship
between changes in capital and changes in risk.
Table 4: Results for the system based on the ratio of capital to total assets
The estimates obtained using the PCA measure of regulatory pressure indicate that
PCAU has a positive and significant impact on capital and no significant impact on risk.18
Undercapitalised banks increase their capital by 1.8 percentage points more than other
banks. This adjustment is larger in amplitude than that observed for the probabilistic
measure of regulatory pressure.
5.4. Interpretation of the results and comparison with evidence on US and UK banks
The positive and significant impact of both regulatory pressure variables on RCWA
indicates that Swiss banks approaching the minimum legal requirements tend to
improve their capital adequacy in order to avoid the penalties implied by a breach of the
guidelines. Regulatory pressure appears to be stronger for undercapitalised banks than
for those within one standard deviation from the trigger, as indicated by the differences
in the amplitude of the capital adjustment. Interestingly, the impact of regulatory
pressure on RCWA is not larger in amplitude for Swiss banks (0.5% for REG and 2.4%
for PCAU on an annual basis) than for UK banks (0.5% for REG on a quarterly basis in
Ediz et al., 1998) and for US banks (5.6% for PCAU on an annual basis in Aggarwal and
Jacques, 1998). This result may reflect Swiss banks' difficulties to adjust their capital in a
relatively illiquid market for small banks' stocks. In any case, it contrasts with the
traditional view that Swiss regulators have, in an international comparison, a stricter
attitude towards undercapitalised or weakly capitalised banks.
The positive and significant impact of regulatory pressure on RCTA and its absence of
influence on RWA indicates that Swiss banks improve their capital adequacy by
increasing their capital (retained earnings, equity issues) and not by decreasing their
risk-taking. Here, it is interesting to note that Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) find that19
undercapitalised banks reduced their risk-weighted assets more than adequately
capitalised banks following the introduction of PCA. This contrast may be explained by
the fact that the market for asset-backed securities, marginal in Switzerland, plays a
central role in the US, where it offers banks a cost-effective way to adjust the risk of their
portfolio.
The observation of a significant and positive relationship between changes in RWA and
changes in RCTA is compatible with the assumption that in a regime of risk-weighted
capital requirements, banks bounded by the capital standards have to adjust RWA and
RCWA in the same direction to keep their RCWA constant. This interpretation is
consistent with the observation of a non-significant relationship between changes in
RCWA and in RWA. Comparison with empirical evidence on US banks indicates that
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) also find a positive
relationship between RCTA and RWA. The absence of a significant relationship between
RCWA and RWA contrasts with the findings of Aggarwal and Jacques (1998), who
observe a negative relationship between RWA and RCWA for the years 1991-1992, and a
positive relationship for 1993.
6. Conclusions
In this study, we have examined the Swiss banks’ capital and risk behaviour during the
period 1989-1995 by estimating a modified version of the model developed by Shrieves
and Dahl (1992). We find that Swiss banks close to the minimum regulatory capital
requirements tend to increase their ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. This indicates20
that regulatory pressure, i.e. the expected penalty implied by a breach of the capital
requirements, has the desired impact on banks’ behaviour.
Moreover, regulatory pressure has a positive and significant impact on the ratio of
capital to total assets, but no significant impact on banks’ risk-taking. This indicates that
for Swiss banks, an increase in available capital through retained earnings or equity
issues is less costly than a downward adjustment in the risk of the portfolio. The absence
of a developed market for asset-backed securities in Switzerland constitutes a plausible
explanation for the relative rigidity of Swiss banks’ portfolios in comparison to what
was observed in studies on US banks.
Interestingly, the impact of regulatory pressure on Swiss banks' capital is not larger in
amplitude than that reported for comparable studies on UK and US banks. This result
contrasts with the traditional view that Swiss regulators have a particularly strict
attitude towards undercapitalised institutions, but it may also reflect Swiss banks'
difficulties to adjust capital in a relatively illiquid market for small banks' stocks.
Finally, we observe a positive and significant relationship between changes in risk and
changes in the ratio of capital to total assets but no significant relationship between
changes in risk and changes in the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. These two
findings are consistent in a regime of risk-based capital standards, as banks constrained
by the capital requirements have to increase their ratio of capital to total assets following
an increase in risk to keep their risk-adjusted capital ratio constant. The positive
relationship between changes in risk and changes in the ratio of capital to total assets
should not be interpreted as an unintended effect of higher capital requirements on21
banks' risk-taking, as the recent evolution of Swiss capital requirements has actually
decreased the capital burden for Swiss banks.22
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Cantonal banks 21.02 6.62
Big banks 8.06 2.15
Regional banks 25.16 7.60
All banks 26.72 3.52
Source: Les Banques suisses en 1996, Swiss National Bank (available in French and German)
Table 2: Mean of variables (in percent)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
REGt-1 0.2288 0.2353 0.1765 0.1830 0.1176 0.0654
REGUt-1 0.0183 0.0000 0.0137 0.0183 0.0228 0.0046
REGAt-1 0.5525 0.5413 0.5342 0.4951 0.4032 0.3515
CAP1t-1(RCTA) 0.0623 0.0622 0.0620 0.0621 0.0642 0.0662
CAP2t-1(RCWA) 0.1085 0.1085 0.1085 0.1093 0.1145 0.1176
RISKt-1(RWA) 0.5815 0.5816 0.5782 0.5754 0.5689 0.5706
ROAt 0.00273 0.00284 0.00258 0.00311 0.00287 0.00301
SIZEt  (natural log ) 12.68 12.76 12.80 12.88 12.99 13.05
LLOSSt 0.00458 0.00622 0.00742 0.00718 0.00530 0.00530
DCAP1t (RCTA) -0.00011 -0.00010 0.00025 0.00188 0.00153 0.00629
DCAP2t (RCWA) -0.00002 0.00012 0.00089 0.00423 0.00248 0.00715
DRISKt  (RWA) -0.00038 -0.00339 -0.00155 -0.00465 0.00194 0.02038
Table 3: results for the systems based on the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets
Probabilistic measure of regulatory pressure PCA measure of regulatory pressure
DCAP2t DRISKt DCAP2t DRISKt
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Dum 90 0,0207 * 0,000 0,0228 * 0,000 0,0272 * 0,000 0,0214 * 0,001
Dum 91 0,0222 * 0,000 0,0172 * 0,005 0,0290 * 0,000 0,0152 * 0,020
Dum 92 0,0230 * 0,000 0,0213 * 0,001 0,0295 * 0,000 0,0197 * 0,005
Dum 93 0,0260 * 0,000 0,0165 * 0,008 0,0322 * 0,000 0,0155 * 0,020
Dum 94 0,0247 * 0,000 0,0241 * 0,000 0,0308 * 0,000 0,0232 * 0,001
Dum 95 0,0290 * 0,000 0,0413 * 0,000 0,0353 * 0,000 0,0407 * 0,000
REGt-1
0,0046 * 0,000 -0,0020 0,329
REGUt-1 0,0236 * 0,023 -0,0163 0,233
REGAt-1 -0,0007 0,466 0,0008 0,662
ROAt
1,7771 * 0,000 1,9834 * 0,000
LLOSSt
-0,0058 0,979 0,0771 0,742
SIZEt
-0,0011 * 0,000 0,0012 * 0,005 -0,0013 * 0,000 0,0012 * 0,007
DCAP2t
0,1301 0,292 0,0251 0,836
DRISKt
0,0430 0,179 0,0306 0,353
CAP2t-1
-0,1233 * 0,000 -0,0645 * 0,000 -0,1498 * 0,000 -0,0644 * 0,000
Adj. R
2 0.088 0.064 0.081 0.057
Note: * represent statistical significance at the 0.05 level2
Table 4: results for the systems based on the ratio of capital to total assets
Probabilistic measure of regulatory pressure PCA measure of regulatory pressure
DCAP1t DRISKt DCAP1t DRISKt
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Dum 90 0,0072 * 0,000 0.0181 * 0.003 0,0086 * 0,000 0,0129 * 0,041
Dum 91 0,0082 * 0,000 0.0123 * 0.038 0,0094 * 0,000 0,0062 0,324
Dum 92 0,0082 * 0,000 0.0151 * 0.017 0,0096 * 0,000 0,0099 0,140
Dum 93 0,0093 * 0,000 0.0082 0.174 0,0110 * 0,000 0,0035 0,582
Dum 94 0,0094 * 0,000 0.0165 * 0.007 0,0104 * 0,000 0,0123 0,059
Dum 95 0,0143 * 0,000 0.0256 * 0.001 0,0136 * 0,000 0,0225 * 0,007
REGt-1
0,0028 * 0,000 -0.0012 0.382
REGUt-1 0,0184 * 0,001 -0,0160 0,196
REGAt-1 0,0009 0,079 -0,0006 0,737
ROAt
1.0180 * 0.000 1,2376 * 0,000
LLOSSt
0.0795 0.697 0,2118 0,324
SIZEt
-0.0003 * 0.009 0.0012 * 0.003 -0,0005 * 0,000 0,0015 * 0,001
DCAP1t
1.7451 * 0.000 1,5182 * 0,000
DRISKt
0.0964 * 0.000 0,0929 * 0,000
CAP1t-1
-0.0916 * 0.000 -0.0559 * 0.000 -0,1074 * 0,000 -0,0551 * 0,000
Adj. R
2 0.114 0.072 0.105 0.043
Note: * represent statistical significance at the 0.05 level